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Fatal Assumption 
A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental 
Disability Cases 
Michael L. Perlin* 
This article questions the a,ssumption that mentally disabled individuals are regularly afforded com-
petent counsel. It finds that such counsel is frequently not available and that our failure to challenge 
this assumption threatens to make illusory reform efforts by lawyers and mental health professionals 
alike. The presence of vigorous, independent counsel is critical, especially since legal rights are not 
self-executing. Such counsel serves an educative function in the entire process, seeks to assure the 
implementation of collateral legal rights, and avoids the "underidentification" of mental disability 
cases. These functions have become more important as the political and social climate has changed 
and as the subject matter has become more complex. A series of reform recommendations is offered 
· to litigators, policy makers, judges, and legislators. 
One of the basic maxims of trial practice is the prohibition against assuming a fact 
not in evidence. Lawyers cannot ask a question on cross-examination that as-
sumes such a fact ("Have you stopped beating your spouse?" is the most noto-
rious example) nor can they assume such a fact either in framing a hypothetical or 
in a summation. A similar proscription bars judges from assuming such facts as 
predicates to their application of law in their opinions. There is nothing contro-
* The author wishes to acknowledge Debbie Dorfman for her research help, David Wexler, Ingo 
Keilitz, Bob Sadoff, and Joel Dvoskin for their helpful comments and encouragement, and Eric 
Janus, Bob Dinerstein, and Natalie Reatig for their helpful and patient explanations about (respec-
tively) the Minnesota and Virginia commitment systems and the federal Protection and Advocacy 
Act. This article is adapted from remarks made at the Symposium on Mental Health and Justice 
Systems Interactions, sponsored by the National Center for State Courts, Arlington, VA, November 
1990. Reprint requests should be addressed to Professor Perlin, New York Law School, 57 Worth 
St., New York, NY 10013. 
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versial about these rules; they have always governed litigation practice and pro-
cedure.1 , 
Yet, much of the discourse of the past several years dealing with all aspects 
of mental disability law assumes a major fact nowhere in evidence: that mentally 
disabled individuals are regularly afforded competent counsel to represent them in 
the whole array of litigation, counseling, negotiating, and advocacy services in 
which counsel is expected to play an important role.2 The general acceptance of 
this illusion has seemingly lulled us into a corollary set of assumptions- about 
commitment law, institutional rights law, the impact of mental disability on the 
criminal trial process, and the legal rights of the formerly institutionalized-that 
has seriously, perhaps fatally, affected the way we view these underlying sub-
stantive and procedural legal issues. 
The growth and development of mental disability law over the past two 
decades has been analyzed through many different filters. Variously, it is seen as 
(a) an outgrowth of the "civil rights revolution" (through which patients and 
expatients replicated the experiences of other disenfranchised and marginalized 
individuals)3 ; (b) a result of changes in funding mechanisms (in which the exis-
tence of financial incentives to reduce patient population-never complemented 
by parallel means of providing adequate program funding in community Ioca-
tions4-helped create a universe in which tightened substantive commitment stan-
dards and more elaborate procedural due process protections at commitment 
1 See e.g. , D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 334, at 415-16 (1979); Myers, The Child 
Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross-Examination, and Impeachment, 18 Pac. L.J. 
801, 857 (1987) (basic maxim); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935); Mcintyre v. State, 
1990 WL 124141 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), at I (bar on cross-examination); See e.g., Stockwell v. 
Stockwell, 116 Idaho 297, 301, 775 P. 2d 611, 615 (1989) (Johnson, J., concurring); State v. Apostle, 
8 Conn. App. 216, 512 A. 2d 947, 956 (1986) (spouse-beating question); Thomas v. Myers, 655 S.W. 
2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Pippin v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 799 S.W. 2d 898, 903 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1990) (bar on use in hypothetical); Crosslin v. State, 489 So. 2d 680,683-84 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986) 
(bar on use on summation). Justice Scalia's opinion in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 
481 U.S. 221 (1987), is criticized for such assumptions in Sobel, First Amendment Standards For 
Government Subsidies of Artistic and Cultural Expression: A Reply to Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, 
41 Vand. L. Rev. 517, 523 (1988). 
2 For the classic statement of this position, see Stone, The Myth of Advocacy, 30 Hosp. & Commun. 
Psychiat. 819, 820-22 (1979); see also, Reinert, A Living Will for a Commitment Hearing, 31 Hosp. 
& Commun. Psychiat. 857 (1980); compare Perlin, Psychiatric Hospitalization: Some Predictions for 
the 80's, in Critical Issues in American Psychiatry and the Law 239, 260-61 (R. Rosner ed. 1982), and 
Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Patient Advocate, 54 Psychiat. Q. 169, 173 (1982) (criticizing 
Stone). As I discuss below, this assumption is shared by key Congressional leaders, see infra note 
91, and federal judges, see infra note 59. Paradoxically, ·overaggressive advocacy on the part of 
patients' lawyers has recently become the target of severe criticisms by psychiatrists, elected polit-
ical officials, and others, who focus blame on such advocacy efforts as a primary cause of home-
lessness among deinstitutionalized patients. See generally, Perlin, Book Review of A. B. Johnson, 
Out of Bedlam: The Truth About Deinstitutionalization, 8 N. Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 557 (1991); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 107-10. 
3 See Perlin, Rights of Ex-Patients in the Community: The Next Frontier? 8 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiat. 
& L. 33, 34 (1980). 
4 See E. F. Torrey, Nowhere to Go; The Tragic Odyssey of the Homeless Mentally Ill25-29, 112-18 
(1988). 
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stated-is that vigorous (perhaps overvigorous) counsel is readily available. 10 This 
incorrect assumption has helped create a mirage that has effectively taken off the 
agenda what is perhaps the most important remaining substantive question of 
mental disability law: Do the institutionalized mentally disabled (or those formerly 
institutionalized or in danger of institutionalization) have access to adequate, 
structured counsel?11 Resolution of this question leads inexorably to the next level 
inquiry: If such counsel is not available, what impact does that have on the future 
of both mental disability law and the lives of the population in question? 
While there has been some episodic evidence of bar development, while some 
jurisdictions have developed statewide or locality-wide specialized advocacy ser-
vices, while the implementation of the Protection and Advocacy For the Mentally 
Ill Act (P&A Act) has ensured the availability of some legal counsel in every state, 
and while the importance of counsel is-finally-being appreciated, 12 the overall 
picture is little better than it was in 1978 when the initial recommendation of 
President Carter's Commission on Mental Health's Task Force on Legal and 
Ethical Issues was the passage of legislation "which would establish and ade-
quately finance a system of comprehensive advocacy services for mentally hand-
icapped persons." 13 And, because the assumption that some kind of counsel is 
now available has transformed the topic into a nonissue, it is more essential than 
ever that we confront the underlying reality: It is little more than an illusion that 
the l<igal system is responsive to the litigational and representational needs of 
mentally disabled individuals. Such individuals remain systematically underrep-
resented in all matters related to their disability. 14 
In Part I, I will restate the historical critique of the role of counsel in cases 
involving mentally disabled persons and will briefly sketch out the varying models 
of appointed counsel available in such cases. 15 In Part II, I will develop my thesis 
that our failure to address this question threatens to render illusory all of the law 
reform efforts, social and political developments, and "rights talk" that have 
the fulfillment of such obligations. For the few cases where states have challenged orders that 
allegedly obliged a hospital to confine a patient inappropriately, see Wexler, supra note 5, at 200. 
10 See e.g., E. F. Torrey, supra note 4, at 156-59; Lamb, Deinstitutiona/ization ·and the Homeless 
Mentally Jll, 35 Hosp. & Commun. Psychiat. 899, 902 (1984) (criticizing patients' rights lawyers as 
a major force behind inappropriate deinstitutionalization and resulting homelessness). I consider 
this critique carefully in Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization and Homelessness: A Story of 
Marginalization, 28 Hou. L. Rev. 63, 86-88 (1991). 
11 On the different models of "organized" and "regularized" counsel, see 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, 
§§8.06-8.10. -
12 Early bar demonstration projects are discussed in 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.10, at 78-4!2, see· also 
id. at §8.08 (discussing New Jersey and New York programs in detail); id. at 8.16 (discussing 42 
U.S.C. §10801 et seq. (Pamphlet 1988) (P&A Act)). 
13 Mental Health and Human Rights: Report on the Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues, 20 Ariz. 
L. Rev. 49, 54 (1978) (Task Panel Report) . 
14 See Herr, supra note 6, at 377. Although the Supreme Court has never found that. there is a 
constitutional right to counsel in involuntary civil commitment cases, other case law is virtually 
unanimous in such a finding. See 2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, Comment to §8.06, at 755. 
1 ~ See infra text accompanying notes 19-37. 
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emerged as standard discourse in this area over the past two decades, 16 and will 
explain why this is so important, focusing particularly on the dilemma that this 
creates in a system such as ours in which rights are not self-executing and on the 
consequential "real world" implications of such a system. 17 In Part Ill, I will 
conclude and offer some modest suggestions for reform. 18 
I. PROVISION OF COUNSEL TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED 
The record of the legal profession in providing meaningful advocacy services 
to mentally disabled persons has been grossly inadequate. 19 Before the early 
1970s, court hearings were infrequently required prior to the ordering of involun-
tary civil commitment,20 counsel was rarely provided, and courts regularly de-
faulted in their decision-makin~ responsibilities.2 1 The historical critique was 
unanimous: 
Traditional, sporadically-appointed counsel .. . were unwilling to pursue necessary in-
vestigations, lacked ... expertise in dealing with mental health problems, and suffered 
from "rolelessness," stemming from near total capitulation to experts, hazily defined 
concepts of success/failure, inability to generate professional or personal interest in the 
patient's dilemma, and lack of a clear definition of the proper advocacy function . As a 
result, counsel ... functioned "as no more than a clerk, ratifying the events that tran-
spired, rather than influencing them. " 22 
Commitment hearings were little more than a ritual, adding only a "falsely 
reassuring patina of respectability to the proceedings.' m In one case study, coun-
sel was so inadequate that a patient's chance for release was actually greater if 
there was no lawyer present.24 On the other hand, when active counsel was 
involved, such lawyers played a critical role in involuntary civil commitment 
proceedings.25 Studies of jurisdictions where such lawyers were available re-
16 See infra text accompanying notes 38-48. 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 49-117. 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 118-21. 
19 Much of the text that accompanies notes 2~37, infra, is adapted from 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, 
Chapte~ 8. On the question of inadequacy of counsel, see generally , Perlin & Sadoff, Ethical Issues 
in the Representation of Indi~iduals in (he Commitment Process, 45 Law & Contemp. Probs. 161 
(Summer 1982). 
20 This section will deal mainly with the availability of counsel as the involuntary civil commitment 
hearings. On the question of the right to counsel in matters beyond commitment and release, see 2 
M. Perlin, supra. note 5, §8.35. . 
21 See Hiday, The Attorney's Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 1027, 1030 
(1982). . 
22 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19, at 164 (footnotes omitted): 
23 Hiday, supra note 21, at 1030, quoting Andalman & Chambers·; Effective Counsel for Persons 
Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey , a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 72 (1974). 
24 Andalman & Chambers, supra note 23, at 72. 
2
s For early surveys, see e.g., Kumasaka & Stokes, Involuntary Hospitalization: Opinions and Atti-
tudes of Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 13 Compreh. Psychiat. 201 (1972); Silverberg, The Civil Com-
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fleeted the significance of "regularized, organized systems[s] of legal service 
delivery ... staffed with full-time advocates whose sole job it is to provide legal 
representation to the handicapped. " 26 
While there is now some sort of provision in each jurisdiction for the provi-
sion of counsel to individuals facing commitment,27 these. systems vary widely in 
their comprehensiveness, in the depth of their mandate, in their commitment to 
specialization, and in their levels of payment. 28 As a result, the quality of the 
representation is uneven, varying both from state to state and within states.29 
While scholars and critics are virtually unanimous that aqvocacy services to the 
mentally disabled should be provided through organized regular mechanisms30 
(such as the New York Mental Hygiene Legal Service, the New Jersey Division 
of Mental Health Advocacy, or the Ohio Legal Rights Advisors) ,31 the ~ast ma-
jority of lawyers who represent the disabled on individual matters are appointed 
on individual basesY Such appointments almost never measure up to the appro-
priate ethical or constitutional standards for such representation33 ; while there is 
mitment Process: Basic Considerations, in I Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped 103, 109 
(B. J. Ennis & P. Friedman, eds. 1973). 
26 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19, at 173. 
27 See Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally ll/, 82 W.Va. L. Rev. 157, 158 (1979). A taxon-
omy for these provisions is suggested in 2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.06, at 756-58. 
28 The different programs are described in id., 8.07. 
29 See id. , §§8.17-19; Zander, supra n~te 5 (discussing county-by-county variance in Wisconsin). 
30 Andalman & Chambers, supra note 23, at 75-79; Durham & LaFond, The Empirical Consequences 
and Policy implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 Yale Law & 
Pol'y Rev. 395, 425-28, 439-43 (1985); see also, Task Panel Report, supra note 13, at 56: 
An essential feature of ... advocacy systems should be their effort to provide a conti-
nuity of legal services to [mentally disabled) persons at all stages of their contact with the 
mental disability system .... In addition to attorneys (an "indispensable element in 
seeking and securing many types of remedies"), the advocacy system should be staffed 
by persons trained as "mental health professionals" . .. , lay advocates, present' and 
former recipients of mental health services, so as to provide a full-time staff with the 
necessary academic training and practical experience to provide full advocacy serviced 
for its clientele. 
(footnotes omitted). 
31 See N.Y. Ment. Hyg. L. §47.03 (McKinney 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. §52:27E-23 et seq. (West Supp. 
1985); Ohio Stat. Ann. §51.23.60 (1990). The New York system is discussed in Gupta, New York's 
Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 405, 448 
(1971); the New Jersey system in Heffner, Legislative Oversight: An Analysis of L. I974, Chapter 
25, Department of the Public Advocate Act, I Seton Hall Legis. J. 75, 80-81 (Summer 1976). 
32 2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.11, at 783-84. 
33 For an early study, see Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 
Ill, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 424 (1966) .. On the broader question of the duties of lawyers representing 
putatively incompetent clients, see Margulies, "Who Are You To Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client 
Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonc/ients, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 213, 225 
n. 83 (1990); Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Legal Decisionmaking and the Question-
ably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515,517-21. To a significant extent, this inadequate job 
may reflect the less-than-vigorous quality of representation implicitly or explicitly favored by a • 
significant number of trial judges assigned to such cases. Experienced lawyers confirm that attempts 
at vigorous cross-examination and at the development of novel defenses are frequently rebuffed-
angrily-by trial judges assigned to civil commitment dockets. (Personal communication, Professor 
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some reported recent improvement in this area, full-time, structured counsel is 
inevitably more effective. 34 Also, while prestigious commissions and expert com-
mentators have called on the private bar to commit greater resources and efforts 
to this area (both by providing representation and training), little has yet been 
done. 35 Notwithstanding the major contributions of a handful of lawyers in private 
practice who have devoted their careers almost exclusively to the representation 
of the handicapped, 36 there is little reason to be optimistic about the likelihood of 
universal invigorated private representation of this population in the near future. 
II. THE ILLUSION OF LEGAL RIGHTS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF COUNSEL 
A. The Rights Illusion 
As long as mentally disabled individuals are not assured of access to ade-
quate, "regularized," and well-structured counsel, many of the questions to 
Which scholars, clinicians, litigators, and courts devote their time and energy will 
have little ultimate impact, and all of the "rights talk" and law reform efforts of 
the past two decades will be little more than an illusion. 37 Consider variously these 
issues: 
• In interpreting substantive civil commitment criteria, establishing the exact 
definition of an "overt act" or the "imminence" of danger as a prelude to 
involuntary civil commitment. 38 
Keri Gould, April26, 1991) (Professor Gould was previously senior attorney for the Mental Hygiene 
Legal Service, New York City.) My own experience-three years as a deputy public defender 
specializing in trials of mentally disabled defendants and eight years as director of New Jersey's 
Division of Mental Health Advocacy-is identical. 
34 
Hiday, Representing Respondents Under New Civil Commitment Statutes: An Analysis of Coun-
sel's Role In and Out of the Courtroom, 5 Law & Pol'y Q. 438,452 (1983). This conclusion depends 
on another assumption: that the trial judge is even aware that organized counsel is available to 
represent the individual facing commitment. See In reCommitment ofC.P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (trial court apparently unaware of existence of state-funded Mental Health 
35 
Advocacy Service). • 
Compare e.g., Task Panel Report, supra note 13, at 59, to see 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.11, at 
36 786 n. 216 (critiquing earlier private bar efforts). 
Such lawyers have frequently played important lead roles in many of the most important mental 
disability law reform cases litigated over the past two decades, and, in a few instances, have devoted 
their private practice nearly exclusively to such work. See e.g. , S. S. Herr, The New Clients: Legal 
Services for Mentally Retarded Persons 64 n. 239 (1979); Schwartz, Fleischner, Schmidt, Gates, 
Costanzo, & Winkelman, Protecting the Rights and Enhancing the Dignity of People With Mental 
Disabilities: Standards for Effective Legal Advocacy, 14 Rutgers LJ. 541, 55a-53 (1983); Herr, 
37 
supra note 6, at 356. 
~ee generally, Lottman, Paper Victories, in Paper Victories and Hard Realities: The Implementa-
tion of the Legal and Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Disabled 93 (V. Bradley & G. Clarke eds. 
38 1976). 
Compare e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E. D. Wis. 1972} (commitment must 
be premised on a recent "overt act"), to United States ex rei. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 
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• In applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the procedures employed in 
such commitment determinations, deciding whether time limits in commit-
ment certificate applications must be interpreted narrowly or expan-
sively. 39 
• In determining the extent of the state's obligation to provide a "right to 
training,' '40 whether individual clinical and treatment issues are cognizable 
at involuntary civil commitment hearings after Youngberg v. Romeo.41 
• In establishing the procedures that must accompany the right to refuse 
treatment, considering whether a "judicial officer model" or an "indepen-
dent evaluator/administrative model" is the most appropriate means of 
vindicating the right. 42 
• In weighing the interplay between deinstitutionalization and homelessness, 
assessing whether a patient's refusal to take medication is a sufficient 
predicate upon which to preclude the consideration of outpatient or com-
munity treatment.43 
• In considering the implication of mental disability for the trial of criminal 
cases, such issues as the length of time that an indictment can be kept open 
against a defendant found incompetent to stand trial in accordance with 
Jackson v. Indiana, 44 the appropriateness of retaining the "volitional" 
prong of the insanity defense in a post-Hinckley universe,45 the applicabil-
ity of Ake v. Oklahoma46 in non-insanity defense cases,47 or the assessment 
of competency in determining whether a death row prisoner· may be exe-
cuted.48 
712 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (rejecting the " overt act" requirement), and see id. at 711 (defining "overt 
act"); see generally, I M. Perlin, supra note 5, §2.13. On the question of "imminence" of harm, see 
In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P. 2d 109, 112-13 (1982) (collecting cases). 
39 Compare e.g., State ex rei. Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 446 N.E. 2d 1387 (1983) (strict 
interpretation), to Matter of Z.O., 197 N.J. Super. 330, 484 A. 2d 1287 (App. Div. 1984) (broad 
interpretation). · 
40 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 407 U.S. 307 (1982). 
41 Compare Matter of Commitment of J.L.J., 210 N.J. Super. I, 509 A. 2d 184, 186 (App. Div. 1985) 
(issue cognizable), to In re Harhut, 367 N.W. 2d 628,632 (Minn. Ct. App_. 1985) (issue generally not 
cognizable). 
42 Compare Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485,495 N.E. 2d"337, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986) Gudicial model), 
to Rennie v. Klein, Civil Action No. 77-2624 (D. N.J., Aug. 16, 1984) (consent order), reprinted in 
2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, §5.37 (administrative model). 
43 See In re J.B., 217 Mont. 504,705 P. 2d 598,602 (1985); on this question generally, see Perlin, supra 
note 10, at 123. 
44 406 u.s. 715 (1972). 
45 See generally, Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Juris-
prudence, 40 Case West. Res. L. Rev. 599 (1989-90). 
46 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 78-82. 
47 See e.g., Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W. 2d 809,814-15 (N.D. 1985) (civil commitment case); In re 
Brown, 1986 WL 13385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986), at 5 (child custody); Matter of Sanders, 108 N .M. 434, 
439, 773 P. 2d 1241, 1246 (Ct. App. 1989) (treatment guardianship revocation). 
48 See e.g., Heilbrun, Treatment of Competency for Execution: An Overview, 5 Behav. Sci. & L. 383 
(1987). 
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If adequate counsel is not available to represent the mentally disabled indi-
viduals in respect to these issues, then the legal disposition ofthese difficult cases 
will have little ultimate impact on the way that the mental disability and justice 
systems interact. Quality ,counsel provides the most likely way-perhaps the only 
likely way-to ensure the effectuation of dignity values in all of these cases. 
Without implementation and vindication of this right, the entire enterprise of 
"mental disability law" is in danger of remaining little more than an intellectually 
interesting but substantively meaningless parlor game. "Progress"-as measured 
by case law development and statutory reform-will be, at best, self-limiting, and, 
at worst, regressive. 
B. Significance of Counsel 
In order for players in the mental disability/justice system to effectuate any 
meaningful change on behalf of mentally disabled persons, it is necessary to focus 
on the critical role of counsel for a series of overlapping and interrelated reasons. 
1. Rights Are Not Self-Executing 
Legal rights are not necessarily self-executing.49 The declaration by a court of 
a right "to" a service or a right to be free " from" an intrusion does not in se 
provide that service or guarantee freedom from intrusion. A right is only a paper 
declaration without an accompanying remedy,50 and, without counsel (so as to 
best guarantee enforcement), there is little chance that the rights "victories" that 
have been won in test case and Jaw reform litigation in this area will have any 
impact on the-mentally disabled population.51 
Three examples should suffice. In 1972, the Supreme Court decided in Jack-
son v. Indiana52 that it violates due process to commit an individual awaiting 
criminal trial for more than the "reasonable period of time" needed to determine 
49 Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 921, 941 (1985). See also, 
e.g., Harvey v. State, 774 P. 2d 87,98 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting The Douglas Letters: Selections From 
the Private Papers of Justice William 0 . Douglas 162 (M. Urofsky ed. 1987) (bill of rights freedoms)); 
Note, A Public Goods Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees Under Attorney Fee Shifting 
Statutes, 189 Duke L.J. 438, 465 n. 151, quoting S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News S908 (civil rights laws not self-executing); 
People v. Kern, 75 N.Y. 2d 638, 651,555 N.Y.S. 2d 647,653,554 N.E. 2d 1235, 1241 (1990) (same); 
State v. Duman, 1990 WL 83986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990), at 2 (speedy trial rights) . 
50 See generally, Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in 
the Federal Courts, 38 Hastings L.J. 665 (1987). 
51 According to Professor Zeigler: 
[A) right without a remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope or a wish . . . . Unless 
a duty can be enforced, it is not really a duty; it is only a voluntary obligation that a 
person can fulfill or not at his whim ... 
. . . Rights promote well-being in the broadest sense. They secure the dignity and 
the integrity of human beings .. . . Rights give people control over their lives and are 
essential to self-respect. 
ld. at 678-79 (footnotes ommitted). 
52 406 u.s. 715 (1972). 
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"whether there is a substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial 
in the foreseeab~e future. " 53 Yet, 13 years later, Professor Bruce Winick re-
ported that, in almost half of the states, Jackson had yet to be implemented, and 
the pre-Jackson problems (of overlong commitments) "still persist[ed]. " 54 In 
another setting, even though the District of Columbia Code contains a pro-
vision that patients can invoke seeking either periodic review of their commit-
ment or an independent psychiatric evaluation, evidence developed in a recent 
case has revealed that, in the 22 years since the passage of the law in question, not 
a single patient had exercised his rights to this statutory review. 55 Similarly, 
hard-fought institutional reform "victories" in cases declaring broad rights· to 
treatment had little "real world" impact when it became clear that there were no 
lawyers available to ensure that the decisions would be properly implemented. 56 
Because rights are not self-executing, the need for counsel is thus further magni-
fied. 
The early flush of victories in test cases filed on behalf of mentally disabled 
individuals-both in procedural and substantive challenges to commitment and 
release laws and in wholesale attacks on conditions of institutional confinement-
may have lulled observers into thinking, incorrectly, that the main battlefield of 
mental disability litigation was the summary judgment motion in the federal dis-
53 /d. at 733 . 
54 Winick, supra note 49, at 940; see also, R. Roesch & S. Golding, Competency to Stand Trial 121-26 
(1980); Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, inS. J. Brake!, J . Parry & B. Weiner, The 
Mentally Disabled and the Law 693, 704 (3d ed. 1985). 
55 Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1987); see generally, Perlin, Morality and 
Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasohing, and 
Cognitive Dissonance, 19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiat. & L. 131, 133 (1991). See also, Wexler, The 
Waivability of Recommitment Hearings, 20 Ariz. L. Rev. 175, 176-78 (1978) (discussing problems 
inherent in patient-initiated review mechanisms). 
56 On the · question of compliance with the court's broad staffing orders in the landmark right to 
treatment case of Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 
1972), affd sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), see generally, Wyatt V. 
Stickney: Retrospect and Prospect (L. R. Jones & R. Parlour, eds. 1981); see also, O'Reilly & 
Sales, Setting Physical Standards for Mental Hospitals: To Whom Should the Courts Listen? 8 Int'l 
J.L. & Psychiat. 301 (1986); O'Reilly & Sales, Privacy for the Institutionalized Mentally ll/: Are 
Court-Ordered Standards Effective? II Law & Hum. Behav. 41 (1987). There are many other 
related potential examples involving potential collateral actions. Although several cases have vin-
dicated patients' right to vote, see e.g., Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Belchertown, 368 
Mass. 631, 334 N .E. 2d 629 (1975); Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J . Super. 439, 354 A. 2d 355 (App. Div. 
176), this right becomes an empty shell if, for instance, there is no staff worker available to drive the 
patient to a poll. The presence of counsel could ensure vindication of this right, by filing a supple-
mental action to order the hospital to provide such transportation, compare Reiser v. Prunty, 727 
P. 2d 538, 547 (Mont. 1986) (hospital and psychiatrist had no responsibility to protect constitutional 
right to vote of patient detained under emergency detention statute). Similarly, a court order man-
dating the constitutional right to visitation, see e.g., Schmidt v. Schubert, 422 F. Supp. 57, 58 (E.D. 
Wis. 1976), becomes meaningless if a hospital announces that it cannot provide adequate staff to 
implement such visitation rights. Again, counsel would be needed to ensure that the original plaintiff 
have an enforceable remedy. (Personal communication, Dr. Robert L. Sadoff, Feb. 2, 1991.) 
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trict court. 57 Without the constant presence of counsel, victories in cases such as 
these remain in danger of deteriorating into "paper victories. " 58 
2. The Myth of Adequate Counsel 
Also, it has been supposed for over a decade that counsel is regularly avail-
able to mentally disabled persons in individual matters involving their comm~t­
ment to, retention in, and release from psychiatric hospitals.59 As previously 
discussed,60 this a~ailability is largely illusory. Further, such representation is 
rarely available in a systemic way in law reform or test cases and is rarely pro-
vided in any systemic way in cases that involve counseling or negotiating short of 
actual litigation. 61 
Empirical surveys are consistent. The quality of counsel remains the single 
most important factor in the disposition of cases in involuntary civil commitment 
systems and in the trial of mentally disabled criminal defendants. 62 It is only when 
counsel is provided in an organized, specialized, and regularized way that there is 
57 This thesis is discussed carefully and comprehensively in its historical perspective in Wexler, 
Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, this issue, 16 Law & 
Hum. Behav. 27-38 (1991). 
58 See, for the classic inquiry, Lottman, supra note 37. 
59 See e.g. , Stone, supra note 2, at 821-22 (charging that a " one-sided advocacy system" exists in 
which patients are regularly represented by zealous and conscientious lawyers); see also, e.g., 
French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affd o.b. 443 U.S. 901 (1979) 
(rejecting plaintiff's assumption that lawyer in involuntary civil commitment case will not act in 
· client's best interest). It should be self-evident that we cannot assume adequacy of counsel from the 
mere fact that a " warm body" stands next to the person in court who faces involuntary commit-
ment. This discussion may appear to assume another fact that it perhaps not in evidence: That 
patients actually receive adequate treatment at such hospitals so as to lessen or ameliorate their 
mental illness. For an analysis of our assumption of treatment staff competency in this regard, and 
its implications for deinstitutionalization policies, see Perlin, supra note 9, at 124-25. 
60 See supra text accompanying notes 19-28.' 
6 1 See e.g ., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (counsel not required in 
hearing held to determine whether prison inmate should be transferred to state psychiatric hospital); 
Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1044 (1990) (counsel not required in hearing held to 
determine whether prisoner has right to refuse involuntary imposition of psychotropic medication). 
Statistics compiled by the National Institute of Mental Health regarding the provision of counsel by 
P&A systems to institutionalized individuals suggest that class-action-type cases were instituted in 
fewer than half of all jurisdictions in fiscal year 1989. Although the same statistics show that 91 class 
· actions were "initiated" during that time period, 46 of these are attributed to only two states. This 
statistical anomaly is perhaps best explained by variance in means of data collection; in those 
jurisdictions, the "initiation" of a class action apparently referred to the provision of any sort of 
counseling or advocacy service to more than one client on any question of legal rights. National 
Institute of Mental Health, FY 1989 Report on Activities Under PL 99-319, the Protection and 
62 Advocacy For Mentally II/ Individuals Act 61 , Table 9 (1990) (P&A Report). 
See 2 M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.02, 11t 744. Beyond the scope of this paper is the important ques-
tion of the implications of lawyers' imposition of their own political or social goals and ideologies on 
their clients. For an important perspective on this question in this context, see Herr, supra note 6, 
at 357. 
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more than a random chance of lasting, systemic change. Yet, few states appear 
willing to provide such counsel in such a manner. 63 
A contrast between the development of case law in Virginia and Minnesota is 
especially instructive. Notwithstanding the fact that Virginia is approximately 
15% more populated than Minnesota,64 in the decade from 1976 to 1986, there 
were only two published litigated civil cases in Virginia involving questions of 
mental hospitalization, while in Minnesota during the same period of time, there 
were at least 101 such cases.65 Virginia has no tradition of providing vigorous 
counsel to the mentally disabled,66 whereas Minnesota does make such provi-
sion.67 
63 See generally, id. §8.08. Beyond the scope of this paper is a detailed investigation of the specific 
ethical issues that must be considered in this context. For discussions of this question, see e.g. , 
Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19; 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §§8.2a-8.23. Also beyond the scope of this 
article is a consideration of other economically based issues. Most persons facing involuntary civil 
commitment are indigent, and any assessment of counsel must weigh this factor as well. See e.g. , 
Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren Burger's 
"Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry 
& L. 149, 157, 163 n. 72 (1981) (210 of213 juveniles facing civil commitment in sample studied were 
indigent). On the special issues affecting lawyers in. the representation of the poor in general, see 
Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. 
L. & Soc'l Change 659 (1987-88). 
64 According to the 1988 census, Virginia's population was 6,015,000, while Minnesota's was 
4,307,000. 
65 Keilitz, Casey, & Keilitz, A Study of the Emergency Mental Health Services and Involuntary Civil 
Commitment Practices in Virginia 47 (1989). Though Minnesota court rules command patients' 
counsel to "advocate vigorously" on behalf of their clients, see Minn. R. Commitment, Rule 1.01 
(1990), there is no comparable provision in Virginia law; cf Va. Stat. §19.2-169.5 (199o) (role of 
counsel in raising insanity in criminal proceedings). 
66 See Keilitz, Casey & Keilitz, supra note 65, at 39-45, and especially at 42 ("Given the absence of 
a district attorney representing the Commonwealth, or an attorney representing the petitioner, 
commitment proceedings are at best, quasi-adversarial" ). For an analysis of locality-by-locality 
involuntary civil commitment practice in Virginia, see Bodman, The Nether World of Involuntary 
Commitment, Wash. Post (Jan. 8, 1984). At the time that Boden wrote, lawyers in Virginia were paid 
$25 for preliminary hearings and another $25 for a final hearing. 
67 Under Minn. R. Commitment, Comment to Rule I (1990): 
A. All proceedings under the [Act] are adversarial. Minimum adversary represen-
tation ordinarily includes, but is not limited to: 
I. being familiar with statute and case law and court rules which govern com-
mitment proceedings; and 
2. interviewing respondent no later than 24 hours after confinement . . . ; and 
3. reviewing respondent's medical records ... early enough to insure sufficient 
time to investigate and secure additional medical evaluations, and/or prepare 
for the hearings; and 
4. contacting or interviewing all persons whose testimony might tend to support 
respondent's position and subpoenaing witnesses if necessary; and, 
5. investigating alternatives less restrictive than those sought in the petition; and 
6. attempting to interview prior to the hearing any persons who might testify for 
the petitioner at the hearing; and 
7. informing respondent of the latter's rights, including the right to appeal. 
B. [This rule] is intended to insure that once appointed, the same lawyer will con-
tinue to represent respondent. . . . 
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The existence of this sort of disparity is especially disturbing in light of the 
detailed empirical database that has been developed by staff members of the 
National Center for State Courts and their colleagues, studying the provision of 
counsel in selected jurisdictions,68 as well as the comprehensive and thoughtful 
Commitment Guidelines. 69 These reports and Guidelines-well documented in 
law reviews and in behavioral journals--could serve as a blueprint for national 
models of counsel provision. 70 Yet, only one of the citations to these recommen-
dations mentions the counsel provisions;71 similarly, the extent to which these 
According to Professor Eric Janus, this court rule grew out of a study commissioned by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court on the involuntary civil commitment process and followed settlement of 
a suit that had sought to force Hennepin County to provide an independent panel of trained counsel 
to represent individuals at such hearings. Janus, now a professor at William Mitchell Law School, 
was formerly a litigator with the Minneapolis Legal Aid office that provided representation to 
mentally disabled persons. (Personal Communications, Professor Eric Janus, February I, 1991 & 
March 13 1991.) 
68 See e.g. , Fitch, Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disabled: Implementation of the Law in 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 14 N.C. Cent. L.J. 406 (1984); Keilitz, Conn & Giampetro, Least 
Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating Concepts Into Practice, 29 ST. L.U.L.J. 
691 (1985); Keilitz, Fitch & McGraw, A Study of Involuntary Civil Commitment in Los Angeles 
County, 14 Sw. U.L. Rev. 238 (1984); Keilitz & McGraw, The Least Restrictive Alternative Doc-
trine in Los Angeles County Civil Commitment, 6 Whittier L. Rev. 35 (1984); Keilitz & Roach, A 
Study of Defense Counsel and the Involuntary Civil Commitment System in Columbus, Ohio, 13 
Cap. U.L. Rev. 175 (1983); McGraw, Fitch, Buckley & Marvell, Civil Commitment in New York 
City: An Analysis of Practice, 5 Pace L. Rev. 259 (1985); Van Duizend & Zimmerman, The Invol-
untary Civil Commitment Process in Chicago: Practices and Procedures, 33 DePaul L. Rev. 225 
(1984). 
69 
See National Center For State Courts, Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment (1986) (Guide-
lines). These Guidelines are considered carefully in Keilitz, NCSC Guidelines for Involuntary Civil 
Commitment: A Workable Framework for Justice in Practice, 39 Hosp. & Commun. Psychiat. 398 
(1988); Wexler, Reforming the Law in Action Through Empirically Grounded Civil Commitment 
Guidelines, 39 Hosp. & Commun. Psychiat. 402 (1988); Appelbaum & Roth, Assessing the NCSC 
Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment From the Clinician's Point of View, 39 Hosp. & 
Commun. Psychiat. 406 (1988). 
70s 
ee e.g., Guidelines, supra note 69, at 44-47 (ensuring effective advocacy for patients' roles and 
duties of patients' counsel), and id. at sa-56 (means of appointing patients' counsel; prehearing 
duties of patients' counsel); see also, L. Arthur, S. Haimowitz & R. Lockwood, Involuntary Civil 
Commitment: A Manual for Lawyers and Judges 9-14 (1988) (role of counsel; means of compen-
71 sation), discussing Guidelines, supra note 69. 
~ee Matter of Stokes, 546 A. 2d 356, 361 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988) (patient's counsel can play an 
Important role in determining disposition alternatives), citing Guidelines, supra note 69. 
For other references to the Guidelines, see In re Melton, 565 A. 2d 635, 646 (D.C. Ct. App. 
1989), vacated 1990 WL 175025 (D.C. Ct. App., Nov. 7, 1990) (need for fact testimony at civil 
commitment hearing); K.C. v. State, 771 P. 2d 774, 777 (Wyo. 1989) (scope of appeal from civil 
c~mmitment order); Stokes, 546 A. 2d at 361 nn. 6, 10 (least restrictive alternative requirement); 
Riese v. St. Mary's Hospital and Medical Center, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 209 
0987), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P. 2d 698 (1989) (refusal 
of medication). 
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recommendations have had a significant impact on subsequent statutory devel-
opments is not clear.72 
3. Counsel's Educative Function 
The presence of structured counsel-of lawyers supported by mental health 
professionals-also serves an important internal educative function by making it 
more likely that all participants in the mental disability . trial process-including 
judges-are sensitized to the social, cultural, and political issues that are involved 
in providing representation to such a marginalized class. 73 The disappointing re-
sults reported over a decade ago by Dr. Normal Poythress (that merely training 
lawyers about psychiatric techniques and psychological nomenclature made little 
difference in ultimate case outcome74) tell us that education about the law and 
about the clinical details of mental illness are not enough; counsel must be atti-
tudinally and ethically75 educated if they are to provide truly adequate represen-
tational services. 
The perfunctory performance of counsel in the areas discussed in this article 
(where mental disability issues are central) contrasts sharply with lawyers' tradi-
tional zealousness in the representation of similarly disabled clients in civil law 
areas such as testamentary capacity, traumatic injury, or competency to make 
business decisions, where mental health issues are collateral.76 The converse is 
also true: Even though mental disability professiona~s rarely complain about ex-
haustive or intensive cross-examination in the latter group of cases, "they are 
often indignant when challenged by an attorney representing a patient in the 
commitment process. " 77 
12 Though there is some anecdotal evidence suggesting that the Guidelines served as a blueprint for 
statutory reform, there is no formal supporting written attribution (personal communication, Dr. 
lngo Keilitz, February 6, 1991). 
73 See generally, Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19, at 168-73; 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §§8.21-8.22. 
74 Poythress concluded that the "trained" lawyers' court behavior did not differ materially from that 
of "untrained" lawyers because the trained lawyers' attitudes toward their clients did not change, 
and such lawyers were not deterred from taking the "traditional, passive, paternal stance" towards 
their clients. Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope 
With Expert Testimony, 2 Law & Hum. Behav. I, 15 (1978). A representative trainee told Poythress: 
"I really enjoyed your workshop, and I've been reading over your materials and its [sic] all very 
interesting, but this is the real world, and we've got to do something with these people. They' re 
sick." Jd. 
" See D. Wexler, Mental Health Law Ill n. 55 (1981); see generally, Note. The Role of Counsel in 
the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 Yale L.J. 1540 (1975). On the addi-
tional lawyering roles that counsel for the mentally disabled person must fill, see 2 M. L. Perlin, 
supra note 5, §8.21, at 807-17. 
76 See 2 M. Perlin, supra 5, §8.20, at 805. 
77 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 19, at 165. At least one prominent forensic psychiatrist attributed such 
reluctance to exposure in an arena where the witness does not retain final authority as "professional 
narcissism." McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for trial and Mental Illness, 49 
B.U. L. Rev. 46 (1%9). 
Similarly, it has been observed that, while the states can generally provide "a very thorough 
examination" of a criminal defendant raising insanity as a plea to a murder indictment, such 
thoroughness is frequently sorely lacking in psychiatric status examinations that precede civil 
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4. Implementation of Collateral Rights 
Further, if counsel is not adequate, then it is unlikely that counsel will seek 
vigorous execution or implementation of other collateral rights . In Ake v. Okla-
homa, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that if a criminal defendant 
made a threshold ex parte showing that his sanity at the time of the offense was 
likely to be a "significant factor". at trial, he was constitutionally entitled to 
state-provided psychiatric assistance on this issue.78 In the subsequent 6 years, 
Ake has been read narrowly and with little creativity79; as a result, the rationale 
of Justice Marshall's opinion-that psychiatrists will be able to assist lay jurors 
"to mak'e a sensible and educated determination" about the defendant's medical 
condition at the time of the offense"80-has rarely been complied with. If mentally 
disabled litigants81 were afforded more adequate counsel, it is likely that Ake 
would have been implemented in a manner more in accordance with the spirit of 
the Supreme Court's decision.82 
5. Underidentification of Mental Disability Cases 
The problems in question are even further magnified where cases are not 
specifically identified as "mental disability cases" (e.g., a criminal trial where a 
mental status defense falls short of the invocation of the insanity plea; a . child 
custody battle where parents' mental illness-but not their incompetenc'y- is at 
issue, and where the court may not " see" the mental disability implications).83 
The problems caused by this judicial myopia are even more alarming in light of the 
predictable aftermath ofthe Supreme Court's sterile and perfunctory adequacy of 
counsel standard set up in Strickland v. Washington84 : Most courts adhere to a 
minimalist reading of Strickland, 85 resulting in a situation where Judge Bazelon's 
commitment. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1004 n. 22 (E.D. Wis. 1972), quoting testimony 
by Dr. David J. Vail , former medical director of the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare. 
78 470 u.s. 68, 74 (1985). 
79 See generally, 3M. Perlin, supra note 5, §17.17, at 550-52, and id. at 157-58 (1991 pocket part) 
(citing cases). 
80 Ake, 470 U.S. at 80. 
81 See supra note 47 (citing the few cases in which Ake has been considered in a civil context). 
82 On the implementation of Ake in general, see Casey & Keilitz, An Evaluation of Mental Health 
Expert Assistance Provided to Indigent Criminal Defendants: Organization, Administration, and 
Fiscal Management, 34 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 19 (1989). On the related ethical implications of Ake, 
see Appelbaum, In the Wake of Ake: The Ethics of Expert Testimony in an Advocate's World, 15 
Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 15 (1987); Rachlin, From Impartial Expert to Adversary in the 
Wake of Ake, 16 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 25 (1985). 
83 See e.g., Easing the Trials of Trial-Disabled Defendants: Competency Assistance Topic of New 
NCSC Study, NCSC Report, Vol. 15, #7 (July 1988), at 1,3. 
84 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, there is no constitutional violation if counsel provides 
"reasonably effective assistance" to be measured objectively by "prevailing professional norms." 
I d. at 687-88; see generally, Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, 
Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in 
Barefoot's Achilles Heel, 3 N.Y.L. Sch. Hum. Rts. Ann. 91 (1985) (discussing Strickland in this 
context). -
8
' See cases cited in 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.30, at 845 n. 617, and id. at 132 (1991 pocket part). 
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worst fantasy-of assigned counsel who are little more than "walking violations 
of the Sixth Amendment"86-has come true. Since such poor representation is 
countenanced in criminal cases involving mental status defenses (even in death 
penalty cases),87 there is no realistic chance of expecting serious scrutiny in civil 
cases.88 
. 6. The Limited Role of P&A's 
While the passage of the P&A Act89 has resulted in the provision of "needed 
rights enforcement services" for certain mentally disabled persons,90 this "legis-
lation is not a panacea for the underlying problems. Although the act is a major 
positive step in the right direction,91 the P&A statute is not a palliative for all of 
the counsel adequacy problems discussed in this paper. 
The legislative history of the Act specifies that it was not Congress's intention 
to authorize P&As to regularly provide assistance at commitment hearings.92 The 
Act was conceived of as a mechanism to prevent institutional neglect and abuse, 
and P&A programs are neither able nor expected to redress all commitment 
issues.93 Further, NIMH policy directives stipulate that P&A money should gen-
86 Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. I, 2 (1973), as quoted in Brown 
v. McGarr, 774 F . 2d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 1985). 
87 For a particularly shocking example, see Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956 (1984) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting from denial of grant of certiorari), discussed in 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, §8.30, at 848 n. 
637. For an excellent overview of all issues, see Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense 
Counsel: The Impact of Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 2_9 B.C. L. Rev. 531 
(1988). 
88 Since Strickland, only a handful of cases have considered effectiveness of counsel standards in the 
context of civil commitment cases. See e.g., Jones v. State, 477 N.E. 2d 353, 357-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1985) (rejecting civil patient's Strickland challenge); In re Dibley, 400 N.W. 2d 186 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987) (rejecting similar ineffectiveness claim on grounds of no prejudice; Strickland not cited); 
compare Matter of Pima Cty. Mental Health Serv., 157 Ariz. 314, 757 P. 2d 118 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel at commitment hearing required evidentiary hearing). 
I consider the implications of Strickland for mentally disabled persons in danger of becoming 
homeless in Perlin, supra note 9, at 126-27. 
89 See 42 U.S.C. §§10801 et seq. (Supp. 1988); see generally, Harvey & Decker, Protection & Advo-
cacy for Persons With Mental Illness: A Resource for Rights Enforcement, 14 Law & Psychology. 
Rev. 211 (1990); 2M. Perlin, supra note 13, §8.16. 
90 Harvey & Decker, supra note 89, at 220. 
91 See 2M. Perlin, supra note 5, Comment to §8.16, at 799-800 (P&A expansion "will inevitably have 
a significant effect on the quality and quantity of advocacy services" made available to institution-
alized mentally disabled persons) (emphasis in original). Compare Sen. Rep. No .. 99-109, reprinted 
in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 361, 1375 (P&A Act will "ensur[e] protective rights to all 
mentally ill persons residing in institutions throughout this country" (additional view by Senator 
Kerry et a/.) (emphasis added). 
92 Report to Accompany S. 2392, Senate Committee on Labor & Human Resources, S. Rpt. No. 
100-454 (August 1988), at 7. When not used to describe the congressional act, the adjective "P&A" 
refers to programs and offices established under the Act. 
93 (Personal communication, Natalie Reatig, Director, Protection and Advocacy Program, Division of 
Education and Service Systems Liaison, NIMH, February 8, 1991). 
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erally not be used for civil commitment hearings, as this is considered a state 
function that should not be supplanted by the federally funded program. 94 
Also, each state is free to establish its own priorities, within the constraints 
of the federal statute and policy guidelines, in determining substantive areas of 
service provision concentration. 95 Some jurisdictions receive only modest funding 
under the Act. 96 Finally, recent P&A statistics reflect the tiny percentage of P&A 
resources that go to litigation in contested cases; moreover, the litigation done by 
P&A offices is not evenly proportioned acrossjurisdictions.97 In short, the P&As 
cannot be relied u'J>on to solve the underlying problems. 
7. The Increased Complexity of Mental Disability Law 
The need for counsel has also increased as the substance of mental disability 
law has become more complicated.98 The retrenchment in the federal courts that 
has resulted in a judiciary that is far more hostile to all sorts of civil rights claims99 
has forced litigators seeking to establish new rights to look to other forums: to 
administrative arenas and to state courts (arguing under state constitutions). 100 As 
94 The NIMH Protection and Advocacy Program: Evolving Policy Guidelines 5 (January I, 1991), and 
see id. (listing limited situations in which P&As can represent individuals at commitment hearings); 
see also, 42 U.S.C. §10821(1) (Supp. 1988) ("non·supplanting" provision ofP&A Act). 
95 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §10805(a)(6) (role of Advisory Council in priority setting); id. §10805(c)(I)(A), 
§10805(c)(2)(B) (role of governing authority in setting-priorities with Advisory Council). 
96 Several states received only a minimum allotment of $152,000 in fiscal year 1989 for all P&A 
services for mentally ill clients. See P&A Report, supra note 61, at 3. 
97 See Harvey & Decker, supra note 89, at 218 (in fiscal year 1988, only I& of all client problems 
- resulted in actual litigation). This statistic, of course, is susceptible to multiple interpretations; it 
may be that it also reflects P&A programs' success in resolving disputes without the need for 
litigation. 
On the lack of proportionality in litigation, see P&A Report, supra note 61, at 59-60, Table 8. 
A sutdy of the P&A statistics also suggests that litigation is generally more likely to occur in those 
states where vigorous mental disability advocacy programs predated P&A passage; e.g., New York, 
New Jersey, Texas, Massachusetts. For a state-by-state analysis of the different ways counsel had 
been provided to mentally disabled individuals prior to the P&A Act, see American Bar Ass'n, 
Comm'n on the Mentally Disabled, Mental Health Advocacy Services Report: Final (undated). 
98 Recently enacted federal statutes now provide new substantive rights for the mentally disabled to 
be free from discrimination, in matters of housing, employment, and access to health services and 
entitlements. See e.g., P.L. 101-366, 104 Stat. 327 (Americans With Disabilities Act); 42 U.S.C. 
§3602 (1990) (Fair Housing Act Amendments)). Without the presence of adequate counsel, these 
statues may perpetuate the illusion that the mentally disabled have certain substantive rights, but 
leave them with no means for seeking the effectuation of those rights. See generally, Bellow & 
Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 
58 B.U. L. Rev. 337 (1978). For a related inquiry, see H. D. Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins 
and Development of National Policy 63 (1990) (discussing political implications of President 
Kennedy's failure to desegregate federally subsidized housing with "a mere presidential pen-
s~roke"); see also id. at 455 (political implications of gap "between agreement with abstract prin-
99 ctples and steps to implement the principles"). 
100 See Perlin, supra note 10, at 136-37. S~e generally, Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally 
Dtsabled: The Last Frontier? 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1249 (1987). The significance of the emergence 
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a result, mental disability lawyers need to continually exhibit more familiarity 
with a far wider variety of substantive and procedural doctrines than they might 
have had to master in the mid-1970s (when it appeared that the civil rights of 
patients and expatients would continue to expand indefinitely). 101 
8. Changes in Social Climate 
The external social climate has also changed. Though the public expressed 
considerable sympathy to and support of lawyers involved in exposes of "shock 
the conscience" facilities in the early 1970s, 102 times have changed. The more 
recent combination of (a) financial austerity, (b) years of socially acceptable 
mean-spiritedness toward the socially disadvantaged, 103 (c) the collapse of many 
supportive social service systems, 104 (d) the "swing of the pendulum" 105 that has 
led many states to once again loosen both substantive commitment criteria and 
procedural due process protections (resulting in new increases in involuntary 
commitment caseloads), 106 and (e) a general weariness with the whole range of 
social problems that seemed to flow from the early civil rights movement in this 
of. state constitutional remedies in this context of the development of mental disability law is 
considered in Wexler, supra note 57. 
101 Three examples should be illustrative. For the past several years, the scope of a patient's right to 
refuse treatment has developed in significantly different' ways in the state and federal court sys-
tems, and it is critical that counsel understand the differences both in doctrine and in the underlying 
rationales. See generally, Perlin, Are Courts Competent To Decide Competency Questions? Strip-
ping the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 957 (1990). 
In a completely different context, patients' counsel-traditionally accustomed to filing suits 
seeking to vindicate their clients' right to refuse medication-are now structuring litigation, seeking 
to vindicate the right to receive certain medications, most notably clozapine. See Edward K. et a/ 
v. White, Civil Action No. 88-3358 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (seeking Clozaril treatment for all class mem-
bers residing at Pennsylvania state psychiatric hospital) (plaintiffs represented by Disabilities Law 
Project); see generally, Winslow, Courts Consider Schizophrenia Drug's Access, Wall. St. J., Oct. 
5, 1990, at Bl (discussing Clozarillitigation); on the advocacy issues, seeP. Margulies, "A Case 
Study of the Cognitive Psychology of Law Reform: Mental Health Advocates' Ambiyalence About 
New Schizophrenia Medication," (paper delivered at the Association of American Law School's 
Section on Law and Mental Disability's annual meeting, Washington, DC, January 1991); see also, 
23 States File Antitrust Suit Against Sandoz, Psychiat. News (Jan. 18, 1991), at I, 6-7. Finally, the 
conflict between the implementation of the least restrictive alternative and the imposition of tort 
liability for premature releases from inpatient facilities has caused advocates to weigh the question 
of whether courts should be involved in release decision making in all cases of patients involun-
tarily committed following a finding of dangerousness to others. See Perlin, supra note 10, at 126 
n. 380 (discussing debate held at annual American Academy of Psychiatry and Law Conference, 
October 1990, on this issue). 
102 See I M. Perlin, supra note 5, § 1.03, at 7--8 (discussing public awareness of institutional conditions . 
as an animating force in the growth of mental disability law). 
103 Perlin, supra note 10, at ~7. 
104 /d. at 74-80. 
105 The pendulum metaphor is employed, inter alia, in Durham & LaFond, supra note 30, at 398; 
Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally 1/1: A System in Need of Change, 29 Viii. L. 
Rev. 367, 379 (1983--84); Shuman, Innovative Statutory Approaches to Civil Commitment: An 
Overview and Critique, 13 Law, Med. & Health Care 284, 286 (1985). 
106 See e .g., Durham & LaFond, supra note 30, at 444. 
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area (focusing on the perceived linkage between deinstitutionalization and home-
lessness), 107 has created a new climate where patients' rights lawyers are seen as 
"the enemy." 108 Professor Jan Costello's anecdotal discussion of the paradig-
matic cocktail party-at which she, as a former patients' rights lawyer, is blamed 
by other partygoers as the primary cause of homelessness 109 -reflects this change 
in political and social climate. In short, mental disability lawyers are working in a 
more hostile and coercive environment, an environment that definitionally height-
ens the demand for a cadre of well-trained and sensitive counsel to provide rep-
resentation to the population in question. 110 
9. Other Moral, Social, and Political Issues 
Adequate counsel is also needed to deal with other collateral moral, social, 
and political issues that, to an important degree, affect legal and public decision 
making in this area. 111 If such issues as the "dilemma of the moral clinician," 112 
the impact of pretextuality on the mental disability trial process, 113 the way that 
the use of "ordinary common sense" drives decision making by judges and jurors 
alike in such cases, 114 and the pervasiveness of heuristic biases in such decision 
making, 115 are not confronted by counsel, it is likely that the pervasive cognitive 
and behavioral biases that infect decision making in this area will continue unno-
ticed and unabated. Finally, the recent interest demonstrated by scholars in "ther-
107 Perlin, supra note 10, at 93-107. 
108 See e.g., E. F. Torrey, supra note 4, at 156-59; see also, Lambert, Psychologists Back Koch Policy 
on Hospitalizing Homeless People, N.Y. Times, Sept. I, 1987, at AI (patients' rights lawyers 
called "crazies" by former NYC Mayor Ed Koch). 
109 J. Costello, "Automony and the Homeless Mentally Ill: Rethinking Civil Commitment in the 
Aftermath of Deinstitutionalization," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of 
American Law School's Section on Law and Mental Disability, San Francisco, CA, Jan. 1990), 
manuscript at 3. 
11
° For a helpful historical perspective, see Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 Yale L.J . 1069 
(1970). 
111 I consider these ideas in greater depth in, inter alia, Perlin, supra note 45; Perlin, supra note 55; 
Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic 
Reasoning, 69 Neb. L. Rev. 3 (1990) (Ordinary Common Sense); and Perlin, Power Imbalances in 
Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9 Behav. Sci. & L. Ill (1991). 
112 
See e.g., Perlin, 'Supra note 55, at 135-36. Here I consider evidence suggesting that, in response to 
legislative actions tightening involuntary civil commitment criteria, some forensic mental health 
professionals answered by suggesting that such mandates could be ignored if they conflicted with 
the witnesses' "moral judgment." 
113 Id ~ 
· at 133-35. By this I mean that there is a dramatic tension between those areas in which courts 
accept dishonesty in certain subject-matter areas and those where they erect insurmountable 
barriers to guard against what they perceive as malingering, feigning, or otherwise misusing the 
114 
legal system. 
See e.g., Ordinary Common Sense, supra note Ill; at 22-39. This concept is considered most 
carefully in Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in Confessions, 136 U. 
11, Pa. L. Rev. 729 (1988). 
Ordinary Common Sense, supra note Ill, at 12- 22. I refer here to the types of simplifying cognitive 
d~vic~s that frequently lead to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions through ignoring or 
~llsusmg rationally useful information. See generally, Saks & Kidd, Human Information Process-
Ing and Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics. 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 123 (1980-Sl). 
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apeutic jurisprudence" should force all participants in the system to begin to 
critically weight the therapeutic (or antitherapeutic) effect of the mental disability 
system. 116 Here, adequate counsel is needed to ensure consideration of the ther-
apeutic potential inherent in mental disability litigation. It is not enough for a 
lawyer to simply argue that the Fourteenth Amendment demands a due process 
hearing prior to involuntary commitment; she also needs to have read, studied, 
and weighed the implications of Ensminger and Liguori's article raising the pos-
sibility that the civil commitment hearing has a distinct, but unexplored, thera-
peutic potential. 117 
In summary, the roles of counsel in the representation of the mentally dis-
abled are multitextured and continually evolving. It is critical for systemic deci-
sion makers to acknowledge these roles, the historic shortcomings of sporadic 
counsel serving the population in question, and ways of attempting to solve some 
of the underlying problems. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I suggest the following recommendations as a modest means of beginning to 
come to grips with the issues discussed above: 
I. Each jurisdiction should study carefully the way counsel is assigned, the 
quality of counsel, and the impact of counsel on the operation of the mental 
disability law system. This investigation should include such issues as when coun-
sel is assigned, the availability of counsel for appellate review, who pays for 
counsel, and who selects those eligible to provide counsel. As part of this inquiry, 
the National Center for State Courts' Guidelines for Involuntary Commitment 
should be closely studied. 
2. Each jurisdiction should make progress toward providing adequate, regu-
larized, structured counsel to all mentally disabled individuals (and should care-
fully assess the way that counsel is provided to represent the hospital or state 
agency that generally take opposing positions). Training should be made available 
for all participants in the judicial decision-making system (including patients' 
counsel, hospital counsel, court administrators, and judges), and lists of trained 
lawyers should be maintained in eachjurisdiction. 118 Also, cooperative continuing 
education programs should be instituted for mental disability professionals to 
sensitize them to the legal issues involved. 
3. Scholars should add this issue to their research agenda119 and should 
116 See Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent (D. Wexler ed. 1990); Wexler, 
supra note 57. 
117 Ensminger & Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unex-
plored Potential, 6. J. Psychiatry & L. 5 (1978), reprinted in D. Wexler ed., supra note 116, at 245. 
For the full range of issues contemplated by Wexler in this context, see Wexler, An Introduction 
to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in D. Wexler ed., supra note 116, at 3-20. 
118 Optimally, there should be some sort of linkages provided between this training and the law school 
curriculum. 
119 Compare e.g., Keilitz, Researching and Reforming the Insanity Defense, 39 Rutgers L. Rev. 47 
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consider new ways of assessing the quality of counsel and its impact on both the 
trial of cases involviqg the mentally disabled and the ultimate outcomes to the 
mentally disabled. 
4. Litigators should carefully assess the way that Supreme Court cases like 
Strickland and Ake affect the role of counsel and should work on new and creative 
strategies (using forums other than federal court, if necessary) to best try to 
ensure that adequate counsel is made available to all mentally disabled litigants. 120 
5. Behavioral researchers should look critically at allegations that seek to 
scapegoat patients' rights lawyers as the true villains in the social drama being 
staged and try to evaluate the extent, if any, to which these charges have merit. 
6. Law schools should devote more time, resources, and commitment both 
to the study of mental disability law as an academic discipline and to the special 
skills and "lawyering" issues involved in the representation of mentally disabled 
Persons through specialized clinics and training programs. 
Although this short list is far from a panacea, at the least it should force 
Participants in the system to critically rethink their often-faulty assumptions about 
counsel and its provision in litigation involving mentally handicapped individuals. 
If that were to happen, then perhaps this area of the law would no longer be, in 
Appelbaum's poignant phrase, the "disfavored stepchild" of the legal process. 121 . 
0987); Steadman, Mental Health Law and the Criminal Offender: Research Directions for the 
120 ~~·s, 39 Rutgers L·. Rev. 81 (1987) . 
. tmilarly. nonlitigator players in this arena need to become aware of the constitutional limitations 
~mposed by cases such as Strickland and Ake's progeny and must be able to factor these limitations 
121 Into their decision making. 
6AppeJbaum, Civil Commitment from a Systems Perspective, this issue, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 1-74 (1991). 
